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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that looking at the concept of neural function through the lens 
of cognition alone risks cognitive myopia: it leads neuroscientists to focus only on mechanisms 
with cognitive functions that process behaviorally relevant information when conceptualizing 
“neural function”. Cognitive myopia tempts researchers to neglect neural mechanisms with 
noncognitive functions which do not process behaviorally relevant information but maintain 
and repair neural and other systems of the body. Cognitive myopia similarly affects philosophy 
of neuroscience because scholars overlook noncognitive functions when analyzing issues 
surrounding e.g., functional decomposition or the multifunctionality of neural structures. I 
argue that we can overcome cognitive myopia by adopting a patchwork approach that 
articulates cognitive and noncognitive “patches” of the concept of neural function. Cognitive 
patches describe mechanisms with causally specific effects on cognition and behavior which 
are likely operative in transforming sensory or other inputs into motor outputs. Noncognitive 
patches describe mechanisms that lack such specific effects; these mechanisms are enabling 
conditions for cognitive functions to occur. I use these distinctions to characterize two 
noncognitive functions at the mesoscale of neural circuits: subsistence functions like breathing 
are implemented by central pattern generators and are necessary to maintain the life of the 
organism. Infrastructural functions like gain control are implemented by canonical 
microcircuits and prevent neural system damage while cognitive processing occurs. By adding 
conceptual patches that describe these functions, a patchwork approach can overcome cognitive 
myopia and help us explain how the brain’s capacities as an information processing device are 
constrained by its ability to maintain and repair itself as a physiological apparatus. 
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We must actively frame semantic pictures if we hope to improve our usage through other means 
than brute trial and error, but it is easily possible to lean upon portraits that are quite badly 
mistaken or shortsighted. 
—— Mark Wilson 
1. Introduction 
 
What are the functions of the central nervous system (CNS) and how do neuroscientists 
conceptualize them? Consider the following general takes: 
A major task of the CNS is to configure the way in which sensory information becomes linked to 
adaptive responses and meaningful experiences (Mesulam 1998, p. 1014).  
If we could observe or feel the brain at work, it would be immediately obvious that neuronal function 
is as related to how we see, interpret, and react, as muscle contractions are related to the movements 
we make. (Llinas 2002, pp. 4). 
Today it is possible to link the molecular dynamics of individual nerve cells to representations of 
perceptual and motor acts in the brain and to relate these internal mechanisms to observable behavior.  
(Kandel et al. 2000, pp. 3–4). 
[The] dream of neurobiology [is] to understand all aspects of interesting and important cognitive 
phenomena—like memory—from the underlying molecular mechanisms through behavior (Stevens 
1996, pp. 1147). 
These quotes suggest that in subfields that study the function and dysfunction of neural 
systems—such as sensory and motor physiology, molecular neurobiology of memory, 
behavioral neurology, biological psychiatry—neuroscientists frequently conceptualize “neural 
function” in the vocabulary of cognition. They try to understand how neural entities and 
activities contribute to external behavior and internal experiences by processing sensory 
information (Mesulam). The brain’s function in cognition is as obvious as the muscles’ function 
in movement, save for the epistemic obstacles (Llinas). To understand cognitive CNS functions, 
the neurosciences must lift those epistemic obstacles and study the neural mechanisms of 
perception, action, learning and memory (Kandel, Stevens). Philosophers have followed such 
neuroscientists in their focus on cognitive CNS functions. Bickle (2003, p. 3) takes Kandel et 
al.’s quote to argue that neuroscientific explanations of cognition and behavior are reductionist, 
while Craver (2007, p. 168) takes Stevens’ quote to argue that such explanations span multiple 
levels. Echoing Mesulam and Llinas, Bechtel (2008) argues that neuroscientists often aim to 
discover and explain “mental mechanisms” that process information relevant to the behavior of 
the organism. These scholars seem to share the intuition that because the brain is the “organ of 
thought”, neural functions are best conceptualized in terms of cognition and behavior.  
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In this paper, I argue that the vocabulary of cognition should be understood as one 
among many useful perspectives on the concept of “neural function”. If we do not take these 
other perspectives into account, we risk what I call cognitive myopia:  
Cognitive myopia: A given description is an instance of “neural function” if and only if it 
characterizes a set of neural entities and activities as processing information that directly 
contributes to one or several cognitive and behavioral capacities of the organism. 
The above definition captures an implicit tendency that is exhibited by all those neuroscientists 
and philosophers who predominantly or exclusively focus on cognitive functions when 
conceptualizing “neural function”. Cognitive myopia does not affect all neuroscientists, since 
many do not study neural mechanisms related to cognition and behavior at all. Yet it is prevalent 
and problematic enough in systems neuroscience contexts and philosophical circles to warrant 
explicit analysis.1 Cognitive myopia proceeds from the claim that the CNS contributes to all 
cognitive and behavioral capacities of an organism to the implicit conclusion that all 
mechanisms that “neural function” refers to are best conceptualized as contributing to cognition 
and behavior. While the former assumption is certainly reasonable and most likely true, the 
latter is likely unreasonable and almost certainly false. The CNS also does many things besides 
cognition: it regulates physiological parameters (e.g., blood pressure, glucose levels, arousal, 
sleep and wake cycle) and it maintains its structural integrity by constantly rebuilding ion 
channels, membranes and synaptic connections (Marder and Goaillard 2006, Squire et al. 2012, 
section IV). I call such neural maintenance and repair processes noncognitive functions: 
Noncognitive functions: Activities of neural entities that (i) do not directly contribute to behavior 
and cognition by processing behaviorally relevant information because they (ii) contribute to 
structural integrity and homeostatic equilibrium by maintaining and repairing neural systems in 
the CNS or other systems within the body. 
This biconditional definition captures three ways in which cognitive myopia can hinder 
the study of noncognitive functions. It can lead researchers to simply overlook such functions 
because it does not count descriptions that fulfill condition (ii) as instances of “neural function”. 
Or it can tempt researchers to shoehorn noncognitive functions into cognitive vocabulary 
although they fulfil condition (i). An example is the tendency to interpret endogenous neural 
activity as directly contributing to cognition (Yuste et al. 2005, Bechtel 2013). Cognitive 
myopia can also tempt researchers to discard entities and activities with noncognitive functions 
as nonfunctional altogether because they fulfil conditions (i) and (ii). Examples of the latter 
                                                          
1 Perhaps cognitive myopia is more problematic in philosophy of neuroscience than in neuroscientific practice as 
a whole. Philosophers often narrowly focus on cognitive, computational and behavioral neuroscience research. An 
exception is Craver and Robins (2009) and Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2009) on biological clocks. 
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tendency are the characterization of task-independent fluctuations as functionally insignificant 
“noise” in early neuroimaging research (Raichle 2015), or the characterization of gamma 
oscillations as an “epiphenomenon” because they do not contribute to visual processing (Ghose 
and Freeman 1992). Cognitive myopia hinders discovery by preventing neuroscientists from 
exploring all possible functions of such activities. By narrowing the search space to information 
processing mechanisms, cognitive myopia also leads to impoverished explanations of cognitive 
capacities. Information processing requires many physiological operations in the CNS that keep 
the organism in homeostatic equilibrium (Marder and Goiallard 2006, Engl and Atwell 2015). 
Cognitive myopia prevents researchers from trying to explain how cognitive functions fit into 
this broader neurophysiological context (cf. Bechtel 2008, pp. 225f.). It hinders them from 
seeing that understanding the CNS as a cognitive machine requires understanding it as a 
biological organ. This point is crucial because it shows that the problem cannot be sidestepped 
by dividing the epistemic labor between say, cognitive neuroscientists studying cognitive 
functions and neurobiologists studying noncognitive ones. Even researchers who primarily care 
about cognitive functions should not background noncognitive functions because they both 
enable and constrain the kinds of cognitive function that the CNS actually supports.  
Besides hindering empirical research, cognitive myopia also affects various issues in 
philosophy of neuroscience. Philosophical analyses of resting state neuroimaging research 
exhibit cognitive myopia: they exclusively focus on its role in revising models of cognitive 
architecture (Bechtel 2013), measuring long-term mental processes (Klein 2014), or drawing 
psychological inferences (McCaffrey and Danks 2017). Similarly, accounts of functional 
decomposition in neuroscience predominantly focus on the localization of cognitive capacities 
in structures of the CNS (Bechtel 2008 chs. 2 & 3, Bechtel and Richardson 2010, chs. 4 & 6). 
They thereby suggest that successful functional decomposition describes the cognitive 
functions of a neural structure, while its noncognitive functions can be backgrounded. 
Philosophers who discuss the problem of multifunctionality reinforce this exclusive focus on 
cognitive function. Philosophical accounts of this problem aim to show how functional 
localization is possible when a neural structure contributes to different cognitive and behavioral 
tasks in different contexts (Rathkopf 2013, McCaffrey 2015, Burnston 2016). These accounts 
exhibit cognitive myopia because they implicitly assume that “multifunctionality” means 
“cognitive multifunctionality”. Cognitive myopia prevents philosophers from including 
noncognitive functions into their accounts of functional decomposition or multifunctionality. 
Even philosophers who primarily care about cognitive functions should not background 
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noncognitive functions because they constrain adequate explanations of cognitive functions and 
are required to situate cognitive functions within the neural infrastructure that enables it. 
In this paper, I argue that we can overcome cognitive myopia by adopting a patchwork 
approach to the concept “neural function”. Rather than imposing pre-conceived philosophical 
theories of concepts onto scientific examples, patchwork approaches focus on the material 
inferential structure of scientific concepts as they are actually used in practice (Wilson 2006, 
Love 2013, Bursten 2016, Novick 2018).2 Scientific concepts develop a patchwork of local 
applications when practitioners use concepts to refer to related but non-identical properties 
when extending them to novel cases in their domain of inquiry. Such differences are not 
reflected immediately in the semantic pictures of a concept, which “embody the generic stories 
that speakers tell themselves with respect to how their predicate’s usage matches to worldly 
support within normal circumstances of application.” (Wilson 2006, p. 516). By recognizing 
the patchwork structure of how a concept is used, scientists can and frequently do correct errors 
in their semantic pictures (see ibid. for historical examples).  
I contend that cognitive myopia provides neuroscientists and philosophers with an 
erroneous semantic picture of “neural function” because it suggests that this concept univocally 
refers to cognitive mechanisms. We can overcome this picture once we recognize that the 
conceptual structure of “neural function” consists of several “patches” that describe either 
cognitive or noncognitive kinds of function. In this paper, I articulate three such patches by 
analysing neural functions at the mesoscale. This scale consists of neural circuits with a few 
100 to ~10.000 cells. Examples of entities at the mesoscale are central pattern generator circuits 
in invertebrates, the spinal cord and brain stem, or microcircuits of synaptically interconnected 
neurons in the cortex (Grillner et al. 2005). A patchwork approach helps neuroscientists to better 
understand what these circuits do because they can contribute to either noncognitive functions 
(central pattern generators) or both cognitive and noncognitive functions (cortical 
microcircuits). By adding noncognitive kinds of function, the patchwork model developed 
below helps us rethink the taxonomy of mesoscale functions beyond a cognitively myopic 
picture of “neural function”. Investigating noncognitive functions is crucial both to understand 
the maintenance and repair mechanisms that are specific to neural systems and to understand 
the constraints on information processing at the very same scale at which given cognitive 
                                                          
2 Patchwork approaches share this broadly naturalistic approach to concepts with a growing number of 
philosophers that focus on the practical roles that concepts play in scientific measurement (Chang 2004), problem 
solving (Nersessian 2008) experimentation and modeling (see Feest and Steinle 2012 and Rouse 2015). 
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function is being studied. By using noncognitive patches of “neural function” to characterize 
these constraints, researchers can understand the enabling conditions of the information 
processing mechanisms that cognitive patches of this concept refer to. 
Sect. 2 motivates the claim that the concept “neural function” exhibits a patchwork 
structure. Cognitive patches of this concept refer to mechanisms with causally specific effects 
on cognition and behavior, while noncognitive patches refer to mechanisms without such 
specific effects. In sect. 3, I use this distinction to articulate two noncognitive patches of “neural 
function”. Subsistence functions like breathing are implemented by central pattern generators 
and maintain the life of the organism. Infrastructural functions like gain control are 
implemented by cortical microcircuits and prevent neural system damage while cognitive 
processing occurs. In sect. 4, I use infrastructural and subsistence patches to articulate a 
tripartite patchwork model that tracks how different kinds of circuit function are distributed at 
the mesoscale. This model helps researchers overcome cognitive myopia because it provides 
empirical and conceptual tools to study kinds of neural circuit that are not adequately described 
as being cognitive. I conclude by showing how a patchwork approach can be extended from 
mesoscale research to other neuroscientific subfields and philosophical research on neural 
functions. 
 
2. Cognitive and noncognitive patches of “neural function” 
 
In this section, I motivate the claim that the concept “neural function” exhibits a patchwork 
structure. I show why “neural function” has different local applications depending on which 
experimental methods and vocabulary neuroscientists use to search for neural mechanisms. 
These local applications render the meaning of “neural function” differently. Each local 
application domain plus methods and vocabulary corresponds to a segment or “patch” in the 
patchwork structure of “neural function”. Cognitive patches of “neural function” refer to 
information processing mechanisms with causally specific effects on cognition and behavior, 
whereas noncognitive patches refer to maintenance and repair mechanisms that lack such 
specific effects.  
The sense of “neural function” that is characteristic of cognitive patches of this concept 
is expressed well by deCharms and Zado (2000, p. 614): “Function is the effect the [neural] 
signal can have on cognitive processes and resultant behavior, e.g. the function of a neuron’s 
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spikes in triggering an eye-blink reflex”. When neuroscientists render the meaning of “neural 
function” this way to search for neural mechanisms, they typically conceptualize these 
mechanisms as processing information that is relevant to the behavior of the whole organism 
(Bechtel 2008, pp. 22–34). Because a neural function qualifies as “cognitive” once it involves 
behaviorally relevant information processing, perceptual, affective and social processing 
mechanisms also fall under this inclusive characterization of cognitive functions (cf. Akagi 
2017, p. 7f.). Neuroscientists frequently use sensory stimuli, behavioral or cognitive tasks to 
study how such information processing mechanisms are executed in response to changes in the 
environment (Rathkopf 2013). They then characterize entities and activities in these 
mechanisms as “senders”, “channels” and “receivers” that “encode”, “transmit” and “decode” 
information about a stimulus or task. Such terms are not simply mathematical tools to describe 
the physical properties of neural systems. When applying information processing vocabulary, 
researchers aim to understand the functional value of neural information processing for the 
organism (Rieke et al. 1999, pp. 13ff., 54–59, Rathkopf 2017, pp. 325ff.).3 The predominant 
assumption is that information processing contributes to cognitive functions: neural systems 
process information about the environment to affect the behavior of the organism (deCharms 
and Zado 2000, pp. 631f., Piccinini and Bahar 2013, p. 456f., Panzeri et al. 2017, p. 471).  
In contrast, the sense of “neural function” that is characteristic of noncognitive patches 
of this concept is expressed well by Marder and Goaillard (2006, p. 563): 
Humans, and other long-lived animals, such as turtles and lobsters, have neurons that live and 
function well for decades. By contrast, ion channel proteins, synaptic receptors and the 
components of signal transduction pathways are constantly turning over in the membrane and 
being replaced, with half-lives of minutes, hours, days or weeks. Therefore, each neuron is 
constantly rebuilding itself from its constituent proteins, using all of the molecular and 
biochemical machinery of the cell. 
When neuroscientists render the meaning of “neural function” this way to search for neural 
mechanisms, they conceptualize these mechanisms as maintaining or repairing neural or other 
organismic subsystems in the face of biological turnover (Raichle 2015). They frequently use 
experimental conditions without sensory stimuli or tasks (e.g. resting state or in vitro 
conditions) to study how maintenance and repair mechanisms are continuously executed across 
global states of the organism (e.g. wakeful rest, sleep, anesthesia). The CNS needs to 
continuously maintain and repair itself because it is an organized system that is not in 
                                                          
3 The historical analyses of the information concept in neuroscience by Garson (2003) and Christen (2006, ch. 3) 
show that this emphasis on functional value both preceded and remained more important than the purely 
quantitative and non-semantic notion of “information” from Shannon’s information theory.  
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thermodynamic equilibrium with its environment (Bechtel 2013, p. 7). To uphold its non-
equilibrium status, the CNS devotes a lot of energy to maintenance and repair, which enables 
and constrains information processing (Engl and Atwell 2015, p. 3417f.). Neuroscientists 
frequently characterize such continuously executed mechanisms as “endogenously active” or 
“homeostatic” (Marder and Goiallard 2006, Bechtel 2013, Raichle 2015). Such mechanisms are 
often executed by specialized neural systems such as central pattern generator circuits (sect. 
3.1). Hence, they should be conceptualized as noncognitive kinds of “neural function”, not just 
as generic biological functions that all organs execute to maintain homeostasis. Neuroscientists 
frequently assume that without specialized neural maintenance and repair mechanisms, “the 
nervous system would be unable to learn, remember, process sensory information, produce 
movements, or perhaps function at all” (O’Leary et al. 2014, p. 817).  
Rather than providing a “mark of cognition”—which is a perennial problem in cognitive 
science, see Akagi (2017)—I use the graded notion of causal specificity to distinguish between 
cognitive and noncognitive kinds of neural function. Woodward (2010, p. 307) illustrates the 
notion of causal specificity in analogy to a radio. The frequency knob has a causally specific 
effect because changing its value has a distinct effect on the frequency that the radio receives. 
The on/off button, in contrast, has a causally nonspecific effect because it simply switches all 
system outputs (e.g., frequency, volume) on or off. Causal specificity is a relational property: 
the on/off button is nonspecific in relation to its effect on frequency reception. In this paper, I 
analyze the causal specificity of neural functions in relation to their effect on cognition and 
behavior. Using Woodward’s analogy as an operational criterion, I claim that clear cases of 
cognitive functions influence cognition and behavior like frequency knobs, whereas clear cases 
of noncognitive functions work like on/off buttons. They differ in their causal specificity in 
relation to cognition and behavior. Because causal specificity is a graded notion, there exists a 
continuum between entities and activities with specific and nonspecific effects on cognition and 
behavior. In this paper I focus on clear cases that lie at each end of that continuum but elsewhere 
discuss intermediate cases (see Haueis 2018 and fn. 13). 
In the ideal case, causal specificity means that manipulating the input to or any activity 
in the cognitive mechanism will set the output variable to a value that is distinct from any value 
that results from other manipulations (Woodward 2010, p. 305; see also Klein 2017). Entities 
whose activities have causally specific effects are likely to be operative in the cognitive 
mechanisms that transform a sensory input into a behaviorally relevant output. The notion of 
“being operative in” is distinct from being necessary or being sufficient (Martin and Deutscher 
Author’s accepted manuscript to appear in Synthese 
 
9 
1966, pp. 178f.). In the context of cognitive functions, “operative in” refers to the entities and 
activities that actually bring about the behavioral change when the cognitive system works as 
it does in the contexts that cognitive neuroscientists care about (see also Craver 2016).  
Unfortunately, neither Martin and Deutscher nor Craver provide a full-fledged analysis of what 
it means to be “operative in”. In this paper, I take causally specific effects to be evidence for an 
entity or activities to be operative in a (cognitive) mechanism. I do not claim that such effects 
define what operative causal conditions are. For example: When visual input arrives in the 
frontal eye field (FEF), some of its neurons encode a visual saliency map by decoding the 
retinotopic position with the strongest input signal (Heinzle et al. 2007). Manipulating that 
activity will change exactly where in the visual field the animal attends its gaze to next. The 
causally specific effect of FEF activity on gaze behavior is evidence that FEF circuits are 
operative in the mechanism that brings about changes in eye saccade behavior when organisms 
attend to their visual environment.  
In cases such as the above, information processing correlates with causal specificity 
because the specific effect of a neural activity will carry a lot of information about the 
behavioral output of the mechanism. This correlation is weakened if a neural structure 
contributes to multiple cognitive functions. The structure’s activity will be less informative 
about the output of each individual function. In multifunctional structures, systematicity can 
serve as additional criterion to attribute behaviorally relevant information processing: there will 
be a regular and predictable relation between changes in neural activity changes in different 
cognitive outputs (Klein 2017).4 Since multifunctionality is not my main concern here, I focus 
on causal specificity to distinguish cognitive and noncognitive functions.  
Noncognitive patches of “neural function” do not refer to operative conditions with 
causally specific effects on cognition and behavior. They refer to entities and activities whose 
maintenance and/or repair functions are necessary enabling conditions for behaviorally relevant 
information processing. As enabling conditions they likely have causally nonspecific effects on 
cognitive mechanisms (Woodward 2010, p. 317). The reason for such nonspecific effects is that 
the CNS must maintain and repair itself and the body constantly while organisms face different 
cognitive demands when behaving in a changing environment. Many distinct manipulations of 
the input to or activities in a noncognitive mechanism will have the same coarse-grained effect 
on cognitive mechanisms. In the simplest case, failure of maintenance and repair switches such 
                                                          
4 I thank Daniel Burnston and an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this point. 
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mechanisms “on” or “off”. For example: manipulating brain stem circuits that control the 
breathing rhythm indirectly interferes with attentional eye control because disrupted breathing 
results in dizziness, confusion, or loss of consciousness. Breathing enables eye control, but 
brain stem respiratory circuits are not operative in this cognitive function. Conversely, many 
manipulations of neural gaze control will likely map onto similar, “normal” breathing rhythms 
because eye movements are not physically taxing. Cognitive effects on breathing are causally 
nonspecific (Grassman et al. 2016). Because of its nonspecific relation to cognition and 
behavior, breathing is a clear case of a noncognitive function. The neural entities and activities 
implementing it enable but are not operative in behaviorally relevant information processing. 
Cognitive myopia blinds researchers to noncognitive functions. It prevents them from 
distinguishing between neural entities that process behaviorally relevant information and those 
that do not. It also prevents them from acknowledging that there are many signaling functions 
(e.g., endogenous circuit firing that controls breathing) that do not directly contribute to 
cognition and behavior. They therefore risk either misattributing information processing to 
noncognitive mechanisms or discarding them as “noise” or “epiphenomena” when they are in 
fact necessary enabling conditions for cognitive processing to occur. Philosophers of 
neuroscience have previously recognized these issues, at least partly. They have argued that 
researchers can address them by combining experiments that measure or manipulate an entity’s 
while tracking changes in the (cognitive) mechanism with experiments that measure or 
manipulate the (cognitive) mechanism while tracking changes of an entity’s activity (Craver 
2007 pp. 139–160). If results from these experiments converge, they provide evidence that an 
entity or activity is operative in a (cognitive) mechanism, rather than being a background 
condition that enables it (Silva, Landreth and Bickle 2013, pp. 55–73). A patchwork approach 
to “neural function” does not compete with these philosophical accounts, but rather adds 
empirical and conceptual tools that are better suited than “background condition” to describe 
the relation between cognitive and noncognitive functions (see sect. 4). Backgrounding these 
enabling conditions prevents researchers from using noncognitive functions to constrain which 
cognitive models are biologically plausible given the neural infrastructure in which cognitive 
functions are situated (sect. 3.2). A patchwork approach to “neural function” helps them to 
avoid these mistakes because it articulates specific conceptual patches to appropriately describe 
what noncognitive functions are and how they constrain cognitive functions. 
I argue that neuroscientists can describe noncognitive functions appropriately by using 
conceptual patches that dispense with information processing vocabulary. Such patches refer to 
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mechanisms that do not represent features of the environment.5 For example: FEF activity 
represents a visual stimulus that is salient to the animal. Neuroscientists mostly use 
“information” in this narrow sense: sequences of neuronal action potentials carry information 
about differences in stimuli from the environment (deRieke et al. 1999, deCharms and Zado 
2000, Garson 2003, Burnston 2016). Noncognitive mechanisms do not carry information in this 
narrow sense. For example: because brain stem circuits that control breathing are continuously 
active, they generate action potentials that carry (almost) no information about differences in 
stimuli from the environment. Of course, we could give up the narrow sense and allow that 
many cellular signaling activities besides action potentials representing environmental stimuli 
carry information (Cao 2014, p. 899). If we apply “information” in this wide sense, we can 
avoid cognitive myopia in part by acknowledging that many neural signaling functions do not 
directly contribute to cognition and behavior. Yet, my argument goes beyond the semantics of 
“information”. Even if noncognitive mechanisms carry “information” simply by being 
responsive to signaling molecules, they are still not operative in cognitive functions. The signals 
they transform do not bring about the behavioral change that is the output of cognitive functions. 
A patchwork approach captures this difference by restricting information processing 
vocabulary to conceptual patches that describe operative conditions for cognition and behavior. 
To appropriately describe enabling conditions for cognition and behavior, researchers need new 
patches that describe noncognitive mechanisms as e.g., “endogenously active” or as 
“maintaining infrastructure”. In the next section, I introduce two such conceptual patches that 
describe subsistence and infrastructural functions.  
 
3. Noncognitive functions of mesoscale neural circuits 
 
In this section, I introduce two patches that describe different kinds of noncognitive functions 
at the mesoscale of neural circuits: subsistence functions implemented by central pattern 
generator circuits and infrastructural functions implemented by cortical microcircuits. Both 
functions are noncognitive because they are causally nonspecific enabling conditions for 
cognition and behavior, and because the respective functional analyses do not require 
information processing vocabulary. To characterize these noncognitive functions, I follow 
                                                          
5 I restrict this claim to environmental information here because I focus on clear cases of noncognitive functions. 
Neural structures representing information about the organism itself may present interesting intermediate cases. 
For example: in the hypothalamus, neural circuits maintain energy homeostasis by representing the energy 
requirements of the body based on gastrointestinal signals with different time-scales (Beutler et al. 2017).  
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causal role theories according to which functional analysis involves the decomposition of a 
containing system S into causal roles ϕ of a system component that contributes to the overall 
capacity ψ of the system (Cummins 1975, McCaffrey 2015).  Adopting causal role theories 
allows me to show that there are analyses of important neural functions whose target capacities 
are not cognitive. This sets the stage for the patchwork approach in sect. 4, which shows why 
the functions picked out by these analyses differ in kind from cognitive circuit functions. 
 
3.1 Central pattern generators contribute to subsistence functions  
Subsistence functions are necessary to maintain the life of the organism. By “maintaining life” 
I mean that the organism maintains a homeostatic equilibrium to prevent the deterioration of its 
parts (e.g., organs and cells). Subsistence fall into two categories: internal systems functions 
like respiration, digestion and circulation, and external locomotor functions such as swimming, 
walking, flying and whisking. Internal systems functions are necessary to transform food into 
inputs for metabolic functions (digestion) and to distribute metabolic products and oxygen 
throughout brain and body (circulation and respiration). Cognitive processing functions cannot 
be fueled without the continuous execution of internal systems functions. Internal systems 
functions enable cognitive processing by maintaining brain and body in homeostatic 
equilibrium. Likewise, basic locomotor capacities maintain the life of the organism because 
they enable organisms to execute cognitive functions. Cognitive functions also serve to 
maintain life, e.g., visual perception helps organisms to find food or avoid predators. But 
cognitive functions serve to maintain the life of the organism only in virtue of being enabled by 
subsistence functions, whereas subsistence functions are independent from cognitive ones (see 
sect. 4). 
Subsistence functions are frequently implemented by neural circuits called central pattern 
generators (CPGs). CPGs can control digestion (lobsters, crabs), circulation (leeches), 
respiration (rodents, cats, humans) and basic locomotor capacities (all of the above). CPGs can 
produce rhythmic motor patterns endogenously, i.e. without sensory input (Yuste et al. 2005, 
Selverston 2010). Recurrent connections, oscillatory membrane properties and 
neuromodulatory input allow them produce motor rhythms even if parts of the organism are 
damaged or absent. The functional analysis of CPG circuits can be schematized as follows:  
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Fig. 1: Schematized functional analysis of CPG circuits. 
Figure 1 depicts how researchers decompose a motor system’s capacity for rhythmic movement 
(ψ) into the role of CPGs to endogenously generate the motor rhythm (ϕCPG1) and the role of 
motoneurons to forward (ϕCPG2) this rhythm to the muscle, which moves (ϕCPG3) the motor 
system in that rhythm. The crucial point is that endogenous rhythm generation (ϕCPG1) does not 
depend on sensory inputs. In the CPG architecture depicted above, two pacemaker populations 
recurrently excite each other and a follower population, which in turn inhibits the pacemakers. 
These circuit interactions create an oscillatory rhythm as output. CPG circuits can create such 
rhythms when isolated from the organism, and sometimes even without neuromodulatory input 
(Marder and Bucher 2007).6 In the intact organism, however, the containing system for 
functional analysis is the motor system to which the CPG rhythm contributes.  
Neural functions of this kind are noncognitive because they are causally nonspecific 
enabling conditions for cognition and behavior. Consider first internal systems CPGs. I already 
discussed breathing as an exemplary noncognitive function above. Digestion and circulation 
work in the same way. If CPGs controlling these functions are necessary for maintaining life, 
they are also necessary for cognitive processing. But it would be wrong to say that respiratory, 
circulatory or digestive CPG activities are operative in any particular cognitive processing 
mechanism they enable. Failure of digestive, circulatory or respiratory activity will indirectly 
interfere with many such mechanisms because it will cause metabolic dysfunctions and shortage 
of energy supply. Such indirect interferences are causally nonspecific either because they shut 
                                                          
6 Neuromodulators are signaling molecules that influence the conductance properties of many neurons over long 
periods of time. In the intact animal, some combination of neuromodulators is necessary to initiate CPG rhythm 
generation (Marder 2012). 
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cognitive mechanisms “off”, or because they perturb many cognitive mechanisms at once (cf. 
Craver 2007, pp. 148f.). Because internal systems CPGs have such causally nonspecific effects, 
they are not operative in, but enabling conditions for cognitive functions.  
Because the CPG concept describes circuit activity that contributes to motor systems, it 
has “the advantage of bypassing the question of how sensory information is coded by single 
neurons or populations of neurons” (Selverston 2010, p. 2331). Because researchers do not have 
to answer the question how CPGs encode sensory information from the environment, 
information processing vocabulary is not required to understand what these circuits do. 
Neuromodulatory inputs do not need to be characterized as senders of information from the 
environment because they are produced internally by neurosecretory structures to keep CPG 
circuits continuously active (Marder 2012, p. 2). CPG units firing action potentials also need 
not be characterized as processing information about the environment because they form a 
recurrent circuit that keeps itself active independently of sensory inputs (cf. Cao 2011, p. 11). 
Describing CPG functions in terms of narrow information processing would be inappropriate 
because the underlying circuits do not encode sensory inputs to generate motor outputs. What 
researchers need to describe instead is how membrane properties, synaptic connectivity and 
neuromodulators endow a CPG circuit with endogenous rhythm generation (ϕCPG1), and how 
this rhythm drives motoneurons (ϕCPG2) and moves muscle groups (ϕCPG3). Such circuits 
perform noncognitive functions. Their component cells do not encode sensory information, and 
they can generate rhythms in the absence of peripheral or cortical feedback. 
Although researchers do not require information processing vocabulary for functional 
CPG decomposition, internal subsistence functions are not causally disconnected from sensory 
and cognitive processing systems. Behavioral and cognitive states like physical exercise or 
emotional arousal modify the rate of cardiac and respiratory rhythms (Appelhans and Luecken 
2006, Homma and Masaoka 2008, Luque-Casado et al. 2013). I call such feedback effects input 
modification (Fig., 1 arrow, top) because sensory input is not necessary for, and has nonspecific 
effects on endogenous rhythm generation. A recent meta-analysis, for instance, revealed that 
increases in cognitive load correlate with higher breathing rates (Grassmann et al. 2016). But 
this effect occurred regardless of whether the load of a memory, attention or mental arithmetic 
task was manipulated. Because of input modification, endogenous rhythm generation is 
consistent with the fact that quantitative details of the rhythm (e.g., frequency or amplitude) can 
be changed by sensory or cortical feedback. The conceptual patch that describes noncognitive 
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subsistence functions allows researchers to separate input modification from the necessity of 
maintaining internal systems capacities at all times.  
 So far, I focused on the decomposition of internal subsistence functions. I now introduce 
the whisking CPG in the rat subcortex as an example of a noncognitive circuit that implements 
an external locomotor function. Whisking is the rhythmic movement of facial hair by which 
rodents identify food, navigate their environment and interact with mates. The whisking CPG 
example serves a dual purpose. First, it shows that cognitive myopia is not only inappropriate 
when researchers study neural systems with no obvious cognitive function (e.g., the digestive 
system in invertebrates). It is also inappropriate when researchers study neural systems with 
cognitive functions (here: the tactile system in rodents). Such systems can still implement 
noncognitive functions at the same scale (here: the mesoscale of circuits) at which cognitive 
ones are implemented . It would be inappropriate to describe these noncognitive, enabling 
functions as “processing information” or as being “operative in” cognition. Second, the 
whisking CPG example shows why researchers need both cognitive and noncognitive concepts 
to examine the relation between decomposed functions. They need both subsistence and 
information processing concepts to recompose the whisker system by situating it in a larger 
containing system (cf. Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2009). 
In rodents, the capacity of whisking is an enabling condition for various cognitive 
functions. If whisking fails, rodents become unable to find food or avoid prey (navigation/object 
recognition) or to identify mating partners (social touch). Thus, whisking is a subsistence 
function that is necessary for rodents to stay alive. After earlier ablation experiments revealed 
that whisking occurs without sensory or cortical feedback, Cramer et al. (2007) hypothesized 
that a subcortical CPG circuit produces the whisking rhythm. They predicted that serotonin 
modulates vibrissa motoneurons in the facial nucleus via a persistent inward current that 
depolarizes the neurons until rhythmic firing occurs. When the researchers first applied a 
serotonin type 2 agonist and then inhibitory agonist riluzole to brain stem slices, vibrissa 
motoneurons started and then stopped firing at whisking frequencies (2–17Hz). From these in 
vitro experiments, they concluded that serotonin is both necessary and sufficient to generate the 
whisking rhythm. They complemented these results with in vivo experiments which suggested 
that premotoneurons in the pargigantocellular nucleus (PGN) supply endogenous serotonin 
input.  Because this nucleus receives connections from the vibrissa motor cortex (VMC), they 
microstimulated the VMC while measuring PGN neurons and intrinsic vibrissa muscle 
responses. Serotonergic PGN spiking and whisking frequency were positively correlated. 
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Therefore Cramer et al. applied the CPG concept to this system: the vibrissa motoneurons 
transform a tonic serotonergic drive into the whisking rhythm. Because the tonic input in the 
whisker system is endogenously produced serotonin, Cramer et al.’s experiments do not refer 
to transient sensory input. Their functional analysis does not invoke information processing 
vocabulary. It does not explain rhythmic whisking as the outcome of neural processing of 
information about the environment. 
Ebbesen et al. (2017) furthermore suggest that information processing in the VMC and 
other cortical areas has a causally nonspecific effect on the subcortical whisking CPG. They 
recorded VMC responses during exploratory whisking, object touch and social touch. In all 
three tasks, over 80% of the modulated neurons decreased firing compared to the baseline 
condition of wakeful rest. VMC firing seems to neither have a task-specific effect, nor to 
activate whisking. When stimulating the VMC below spiking threshold during social touch, the 
researchers recorded increased hyperpolarization in layer 5 output cells. Above-threshold 
stimulation and pharmacological blockage of VMC firing caused the rats to protract their 
contralateral whiskers and shortened social whisker touches. These results “support a model in 
which VMC activity supresses whisker behavior, perhaps by gating a downstream whisking 
central pattern generator” (ibid., p. 87). In this model, the VMC inhibits a continuously active 
CPG circuit in a causally nonspecific manner, rather than episodically activating a silent 
subcortical nucleus on task demand. VMC activity and sensory processing (e.g., in barrel 
cortex) supresses this rhythm equally across all contexts in which whisking is ecologically 
irrelevant. This circuit organization can be depicted as follows: 
 
Fig. 2: Simplified circuit diagram for whisking generation in rats. 
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Figure 2 shows that the whisking rhythm can be centrally generated (black arrows, lower left), 
independently of sensory feedback and cortical information processing (black arrows, upper 
right and middle). The flow of behaviorally relevant information does not encompass the 
subcortical CPG circuit itself, because that circuit is continuously active as long as the PGN 
endogenously generates serotonin. When the behaving animal responds to transient 
environmental inputs, CPG activity is subject to input modification via the presumed inhibitory 
connection between VMC and PGN neurons. The diagram therefore exemplifies how a 
noncognitive functional analysis divorces endogenous rhythm generation from narrow 
information processing in neural systems underlying overt behavior such as whisking. It thus 
challenges Bechtel’s analysis of endogenous brain activity (e.g., whisking CPG activity) as 
being operative in cognitive information processing because it “directly affects mental 
processes and behavioral activities” (2013, 19).  
The above diagram shows how circuit researchers can avoid cognitive myopia by 
recognizing that the rodent brain executes both cognitive and noncognitive functions. The 
diagram can be used to recompose subsistence and information processing functions in a larger 
containing system (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2009). For example: Moore et al. (2013) 
discovered that parts of the reticular formation also belong to the whisking CPG, because 
chemically activating them drives vibrissa motoneurons while lesioning them inhibits 
ipsilateral whisking. Since whisking unit firing was coupled to the breathing rhythm, the authors 
suggest that the brainstem respiratory CPG could act as a “master clock” for facial behaviors 
(e.g., whisking, chewing, licking). These findings add further details to the pathway of central 
pattern generation in Fig. 2. Conversely, Sreenivasan et al. (2014) used viral vectors and 
optogenetic stimulation to visualize and manipulate parallel somatosensory and motor 
pathways that selectively activate or supress contralateral whisker movements. These findings 
add further details to the pathway of cortical information processing. Adding the subsistence 
function of breathing or the cognitive function of somatosensory processing to the diagram 
shows how researchers can recompose noncognitive and cognitive functions by specifying their 
interactions in a larger containing system.  
To summarize: CPGs with subsistence functions are necessary to maintain the life of the 
organism and enable various cognitive functions to occur. Endogenous rhythm generation 
makes subsistence functions independent from sensory and cortical feedback. Cognitive 
myopia tempts researchers to interpret this endogenous activity as cognitive (Yuste et al. 2005, 
Bechtel 2013). But CPGs are not operative in the cognitive mechanisms from which they 
Author’s accepted manuscript to appear in Synthese 
 
18 
receive input modification. To avoid shoehorning them into cognitive vocabulary, CPGs should 
be analysed without information processing concepts or cognitive tasks. The conceptual patch 
of “subsistence function” allows researchers to appropriately understand what these circuits do, 
whereas a cognitively myopic picture of “neural function” does not.  
 
3.2 Cortical microcircuits contribute to infrastructural functions  
Infrastructural functions prevent neural system damage while behaviorally relevant information 
processing occurs. They occur “irrespectively of the particular systems-level function to which 
any of the systems happens to be dedicated” (Merker 2013, p. 402). They are noncognitive 
because they are causally nonspecific enabling conditions for cognition: if they fail, circuit 
infrastructure gets damaged and becomes unable to process information. Because cognitively 
myopic researchers tend to overlook infrastructural functions, they fail to explain how cognitive 
functions are constrained by the physiological apparatus that maintains the brain’s structural 
integrity. Below I focus on the capacity of gain control to argue that infrastructural functions 
provide crucial constraints on cognitive functions in cortical circuits. 
The neuroscientific concept of gain control originated from exploratory experiments by 
Kirschfeld (1992), who found that the analogues of cortical gamma oscillations in the fly optic 
lobe do not systematically depend on visual stimulus parameters. Unlike Ghose and Freeman 
(1992) who concluded from similar results that oscillations in the cat visual cortex are 
epiphenomenal, Kirschfeld freed himself from cognitive myopia. He sketched the noncognitive 
mechanism of gain control in which oscillations provide a negative feedback signal to activate 
an inhibitory brake (1992, p. 4767).7 Because oscillations arise from excitatory-inhibitory 
interactions, they signal that further activation leads to circuit over-excitation. To prevent over-
excitation, the inhibitory brake controls the gain of excitatory circuit elements by decreasing 
their spiking probability. Without gain control preventing over-excitation, neural infrastructure 
gets damaged and information processing cannot occur.  
Kirschfeld’s mechanism sketch can be applied to cortical circuits by adding explanatory 
details to the “canonical microcircuit” (CMC). The CMC describes two recurrently connected 
excitatory populations whose activity is balanced by a recurrently connected inhibitory 
                                                          
7 Sometimes the term “gain control” appears in explanations of how neurons adapt their responses to variations in 
sensory input (e.g. contrast or luminance in the visual system, cf. Heeger 1992). As will become clear below, this 
multiplicative effect to enhance narrow information processing is better described as neural gain modulation, 
whereas gain control refers to the divisive and switch-like effect to prevent circuit damage. 
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population (Douglas and Martin 1991). Researchers can use the CMC concept to analyse both 
cognitive and noncognitive functions of cortical circuits. Consider first a cognitive analysis 
using the CMC concept: 
 
Fig. 3: Direction-selective circuit responses in primary visual cortex (V1).  
Adapted from Douglas and Martin (1991, Fig. 5). 
Figure 3 exemplifies how researchers analyse mesoscale circuits when working on a cognitive 
patch of “neural function”. Direction-selective responses are explained by the temporal 
difference in non-selective input from the visual thalamus (blue circles, left) to two simplified 
CMC modules (A and B). When thalamic activity is temporally displaced in the preferred 
direction (dashed grey arrow), module A recurrently excites itself and module B, leading to a 
direction-selective output. When thalamic activity occurs in the non-preferred direction, 
inhibitory neurons in module A activate first and prevent recurrent excitation of A and B. Such 
cognitive functional analyses add explanatory details about behaviorally relevant information 
processing to the CMC model. By contrast, noncognitive functional analyses add explanatory 
details about infrastructural maintenance to the CMC model. In gain control, these details 
specify the causal role of negative oscillatory feedback (ϕGC1) and the inhibitory brake (ϕGC2). 
First, cortical gamma oscillations (30–80Hz) can provide a negative feedback signal for 
gain control (ϕGC1). Excitatory cell firing causes inhibitory cells to fire, which in turn inhibit the 
excitatory cells. This interaction creates an oscillatory wave with excitatory spikes occurring 
during the peak and inhibitory spikes occurring during the through of the wave (Bartos et al. 
2007). Because they arise from circuit interactions, gamma oscillations can signal how active a 
given circuit is. This negative feedback role (ϕGC1) can occur irrespective of the particular 
information processing task the circuit contributes to. When analysing gain control, researchers 
can add (ϕGC1) to the CMC model, because it refers to circuits that oscillate in the gamma range 
(Grillner et al. 2005). Second, chandelier cells can act as inhibitory brakes in the cortex (ϕGC2). 
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They exclusively synapse onto the axon hillocks of excitatory pyramidal neurons. Because 
action potentials are generated at the axon hillock, chandelier cells can directly prevent 
pyramidal firing. When Zhu et al. (2004) disrupted the excitation-inhibition balance in barrel 
cortex circuits, chandelier firing increased 22fold, whereas other neurons increased firing only 
1.6fold. They concluded that “chandelier cells may function as the last defense to keep network 
excitability from going out of control” (ibid., p. 5107). When analysing gain control, researchers 
can add (ϕGC2) to the CMC model by separating the infrastructural role of chandelier neurons 
(prevent over-excitation) from the infrastructural role of other inhibitory neurons (maintain 
excitation-inhibition balance). Besides adding (ϕGC1) and (ϕGC2) to the CMC, the gain control 
analysis specifies switch points for this infrastructural function. At low pyramidal firing rates, 
no gain control occurs because chandelier cells provide a “window of excitation”: their 
hyperpolarizing effect decays faster than the depolarizing effect (Woodruff et al. 2010, Fig. 2c). 
At intermediate firing rates, gain control sets in because chandelier inhibition outruns the initial 
depolarizing effect (Merker 2013). At high pyramidal firing rates, chandelier inhibition 
increases drastically to prevent over-excitation (Zhu et al. 2004).  
The functional analysis of gain control can now be formulated as follows (see Fig. 4). 
When cortical microcircuits start firing in response to sensory or cortical inputs, chandelier cells 
enable information processing because they provide pyramidal cells with a “window of 
excitation”. Over time, information processing leads to excitatory-inhibitory interactions, 
generating gamma oscillations within the circuit. If these oscillations indicate intermediate 
circuit firing, chandelier inhibition results in divisive gain control: pyramidal firing rates are 
reduced by a divisive factor (Abbot and Chance 2005, p. 148). When the pyramidal cells 
continue to increase their firing, however, chandelier cells act as inhibitory brakes by 
subtractively decreasing pyramidal firing. The role of gamma oscillations in gain control would 
be “analogous to the “ringing” that can be used to tune a microphone – amplifier – loudspeaker 
system to keep it from breaking into howling feedback” (Merker 2013, p. 406). This comparison 
fits well with the observation that gamma oscillations are transitioning into seizure activity in 
in vitro experiments when inhibition is missing, and in patients with photosensitive epilepsy 
where chandelier cells are scarce or absent (de Felipe 1999).  
The infrastructural function of gain control is noncognitive because negative gamma 
feedback and chandelier activities are causally nonspecific enabling conditions for cognitive 
functions. Consider first gamma oscillations. A puzzling finding is that they occur together with 
some, but not other visual stimuli (Ghose and Freeman 1992, Hermes et al. 2015). The gain 
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control analysis explains this irregularity as follows: what influences gamma oscillations is not 
which stimulus feature is processed, but how much circuit activity that processing requires. 
When experimenters manipulate a cognitive function by presenting a certain stimulus, they 
often observe increased circuit firing. But whether this increase is enough to induce oscillations 
does not depend on the type of behavior to which the cognitive circuit function contributes. 
Cognitive manipulations have nonspecific effects on oscillations because they are mapped to 
circuit activity levels relevant for gain control. Gamma oscillations do not provide negative 
feedback about the content of information processing, but about the activity level that a circuit 
requires to process information. Consider now chandelier cells. Any effect of information 
processing is mapped onto one of three states: (i) window of excitation, (ii) divisive gain 
control, (iii) inhibitory brake. That mapping does not depend on the content of the information 
processing task. It depends on physiological circuit parameters, like firing rate, axon hillock 
polarization, and negative gamma feedback. These parameters do not specify informational 
content, but causal switch points for gain control to prevent damage of neural infrastructure.   
This lack of causal specificity is evidence that infrastructural functions like gain control 
are enabling conditions for cognitive functions. Properly working infrastructural functions 
enable many behaviors controlled by cortical circuit processing (e.g., motion detection, eye 
gaze control). But if they are disrupted, cognitive mechanisms controlling these behaviors are 
“shut off”. When chandelier cells are lost, sensory input causes seizure activity instead of 
regular information processing. Gain control is thus a fundamental constraint on cognitive 
functioning: if it does not prevent damage, the CNS cannot process the sensory information it 
needs to adaptively respond to the environment. The specific composition of infrastructural 
functions matters to explain how exactly information processing can work. Reference to 
specialized gain control units—chandelier cells—is required to explain exactly how circuits in 
the cortex can process information at all. The conceptual patch describing infrastructural 
functions allows researchers to recognize these constraints, whereas a cognitively myopic view 
on cortical circuit function does not. Researchers working on this patch do not require 
informational concepts because they can use physical, non-semantic properties to describe the 
signaling roles of entities or activities that implement infrastructural functions (cf. Cao 2011, 
p. 6). Negative gamma feedback indicates that processing occurs at a particular circuit activity 
level, but not which kind of information is being processed (Merker 2013). Chandelier cells do 
not process sensory information but monitor circuit activity levels to act as divisive gain 
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controllers or inhibitory brakes (Zhu et al. 2004). Consequently, the relation between gain 
control and information processing can be visualized as follows:  
 
Fig. 4: Information processing and gain control in cortical microcircuits. 
The above diagram shows that we can overcome cognitive myopia by recognizing that cortical 
microcircuits execute both cognitive and noncognitive functions. To analyse these functions, 
researchers can use the CMC concept (E and I nodes and connections, left). When studying 
cognitive functions, they add explanatory details about the input signal (stimulus type), signal 
transformation (extraction of behaviorally relevant features), and the receiver of the signal 
output. Cognitive functional analyses (arrows from lower left to upper right) refer to circuit 
elements that are operative in behaviorally relevant information processing (e.g., computing 
stimulus direction or controlling eye saccade behavior). When studying noncognitive functions 
like gain control, researchers add explanatory information about circuit activity levels, negative 
feedback and divisive or subtractive inhibition. Infrastructural analyses (arrow, lower right) 
therefore refer to circuit elements that enable cognitive circuit activity by preventing damage.  
Infrastructural functions do not only enable, but also constrain cognitive functions. To 
incorporate these constraints, researchers need to recompose infrastructural and cognitive 
functions. Consider multiplicative gain modulation, which increases pyramidal firing rates by 
a multiplying factor. Ni et al. (2016) studied this effect in macaques to test the “communication 
through coherence hypothesis”: stimulus-dependent gamma oscillations in V1 entrain V4 
neurons, which temporarily enhances information transmission. During an attention task, V4 
activity oscillated in the gamma frequency (40–60Hz). The multiplicative gain of the oscillatory 
activity was behaviorally relevant because macaques shifted their attention quickest when the 
strongest gamma-phase-locked firing occurred. Infrastructural gain control constrains this 
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cognitive function as follows: when chandelier cells depolarize the axon hillock, they provide 
a “window of excitation” during which multiplicative gain modulation can occur. When 
pyramidal firing continues, increased chandelier inhibition levels replace multiplicative gain 
modulation with divisive gain control. This recomposition assigns a positive feedforward role 
to gamma oscillations as enhancing information transmission between two areas (in Ni et al.’s 
case: V1 and V4), and a negative feedback role to oscillations for controlling circuit gain within 
an area. The constraint in this recomposition is that gamma oscillations can only enhance 
information transmission below the switch point for divisive gain control. Researchers must not 
ignore such infrastructural functions if they want to explain how cognition is coherent with 
maintaining the brain’s structural integrity.8 
In this section, I introduced two conceptual patches that appropriately describe 
noncognitive circuit functions. Such noncognitive functions enable cognition and maintain the 
structural integrity of the CNS and other parts of the body. Cognitive myopia prevents 
researchers from adequately studying these functions because it suggests that “neural function” 
univocally refers to cognitive information processing mechanisms. In the next section, I 
articulate a semantic picture of “neural function” that overcomes cognitive myopia by 
recognizing that this concept has both cognitive and noncognitive patches of local application.  
 
4. A patchwork approach to “neural function” at the mesoscale 
 
The examples from the previous section suggest that neuroscientists use the concept “neural 
function” to refer not only to cognitive, but also to noncognitive kinds of function. Because 
cognitive myopia only recognizes applications of “neural function” to cognitive functions, it 
provides an erroneous semantic picture of this concept. In this section, I propose that a 
patchwork approach to “neural function” is a proper corrective to cognitive myopia. So far, I 
followed causal role theories of function to describe how researchers analyse subsistence and 
infrastructural functions. Causal role theories can acknowledge that neural structures contribute 
to capacities that are not cognitive, such as breathing or gain control. But they do not provide 
resources to show why these neural functions differ in kind from functions that contribute to 
cognitive capacities. Absent further mechanistic or evolutionary constraints (Craver 2007, ch. 
4, Šustar 2007), causal role theories only support the claim that different functional analyses in 
                                                          
8 Further constraints can be added by including other infrastructural functions such as the role of microglia cells 
to remove amyloid plaques when stimulated in the gamma frequency (Iaccarino et al. 2016). Plaque removal 
enables and constrains learning and memory mechanisms because it prevents onset of neurodegenerative diseases.  
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neuroscience pick out different capacities with different vocabulary. Hence one cannot block 
the argument that such differences in using “neural function” are merely superficial, and that a 
unified conceptual framework to analyse all neural functions remains preferable. Cognitive 
myopia suggests that cognitive and information processing concepts provide such a framework. 
To undercut its plausibility, one needs to show that a) cognitive, subsistence and infrastructural 
functions differ in kind and that b) when analysing such functions, neuroscientists render the 
meaning of “neural function” in different ways. A bare bones causal role theory provides no 
resources to support a), and therefore cannot be used to infer that b) is the case.9 In contrast, a 
patchwork approach supports both claims because it shows exactly why conceptual patches of 
“neural function” distribute themselves over various kinds of function at the mesoscale.  
To understand why conceptual patches refer to different kinds, consider the concept of 
“hardness” in materials science (Wilson 2006). When applying “hardness” to metals, 
researchers use indenter tests to measure the physical property of yield strength. When applied 
to elastomers such as rubbers, however, indenter tests supply anomalous results because the 
elastic surface of rubbers recovers too quickly after indentation. Researchers therefore use 
durometer tests in elastomers, which refer to Young’s modulus of elasticity. These local 
applications plus experimental methods form two patches in the patchwork structure “hardness” 
(ibid., pp. 335–45). Yet the indenter/yield strength and durometer/elasticity patches partially 
overlap, because they both supply sensible results for polyamide materials like nylon. Scientists 
can therefore use the two patches of “hardness” to describe three kinds of material: metals, 
polyamides and elastomers. The patchwork structure of “hardness” arises as “a consequence of 
members of certain higher-level kinds […] to exhibit similar behaviors—that metals are all 
susceptible to [indenter] tests is both a fact about how the concept ‘hardness’ behaves around 
that kind of materials, as well as a fact about the class of materials themselves” (Bursten 2016, 
p. 7f.). Therefore, the patchwork structure of a concept like “hard” is not simply determined by 
the tests used to measure it; it crucially depends on how empirical properties (here: yield 
strength, elasticity) are distributed among the kinds of entities that the concept picks out. 
Patchwork approaches claim that the heterogeneous structure of concepts is useful to 
scientists because it tracks the distribution of kinds in their application domain. I use “kind” 
here in a methodological, not in a semantic or metaphysical sense. As methodological tools, 
kind concepts enable scientists to perform experimental interventions, confirm hypotheses and 
                                                          
9 I thank an anonymous reviewer on pressing me to clarify why causal role theories are insufficient to overcome 
cognitive myopia. 
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construct explanations (cf. Bursten 2016, p. 5). Methodological analyses in philosophy of 
science do not aim to show how kind concepts carve nature at its joints or possess a fixed 
reference. They rather aim to show how concepts pick out properties that are interesting to 
scientists because they can be “robustly detected, measured, manipulated, and intervened upon” 
(ibid., p. 8). Patchwork approaches show that concepts can fulfil such roles because scientists 
introduce experimental conditions that provide—at least preliminary—application criteria of 
the concepts to entities or activities in the domain of inquiry (Haueis 2014, 2018). Such local 
experimental conditions can operationally define new concepts without being supported by a 
unified theory about the domain (cf. Wilson 2006, pp. 180ff.). Rather than being determined 
beforehand, the application domain of such novel concepts is discovered in the process of 
extending them to novel cases in a stepwise fashion.10 If such stepwise extensions shift the 
reference to entities with novel properties or behaviors in the domain, the concepts will develop 
partially overlapping local patches of application. Ideally, each patch picks out a different kind 
of entity, with intermediate cases lying in the overlapping region of two patches. A conceptual 
patch provides researchers the experimental and conceptual tools (e.g. instruments, operational 
definitions, inductive inference rules) to detect, measure, manipulate or predict the properties 
or behaviors of that kind. Conceptual patchwork structures as a whole provide researchers with 
the methodological tools to classify kinds of entities and activities in their domain of inquiry.  
By adopting a patchwork approach to “neural function”, I propose that this concept 
possesses a heterogenous structure of locally adapted applications. Such a structure is useful to 
neuroscientists because it tracks the distribution of different kinds of function in the neural 
domain. At the mesoscale of neural circuits, “neural function” consists of three patches that 
refer to subsistence, infrastructural and cognitive functions. Cognitive myopia mistakenly 
suggests that this concept only tracks one kind of circuit function—behaviorally relevant 
information processing. In contrast, a patchwork approach captures the fact that neuroscientists 
use “neural function” to refer to (at least) two other kinds of circuit function that are not 
appropriately characterized as being cognitive. A patchwork approach recognizes the 
differences in cognitive and noncognitive functional analyses as part of the empirical and 
conceptual tools to track different kinds of circuit function. When neuroscientists use these tools 
to study neural circuits under different experimental conditions, they render the meaning of 
                                                          
10  Patchwork approaches thus differ from holist theories which posit a unified theory or essentialist theories that 
posit a universal referential relation to a natural kind to explain how concepts acquire their meaning. Patchwork 
approaches are better suited to analyse how concepts behave in scientific practice, where exploratory concept 
formation and changes of reference occur frequently (see Haueis 2018, chs. 2 and 3 for historical examples). 
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“neural function” in different ways. For example: when electrophysiologists track how 
manipulations of sensory input change the circuit output in specific ways, they render the 
meaning of “neural function” cognitively. They use this concept to refer to operative conditions 
in behaviorally relevant information processing. Cognitive myopia suggests that such a 
cognitive rendering works for all instances of “neural function”. In contrast, a patchwork 
approach shows why the cognitive patch of “neural function” does not provide the right tools 
to robustly detect, manipulate and predict the behavior of circuits with noncognitive functions. 
For example: varying sensory inputs to detect changes in circuit output is an inappropriate 
method to understand what CPG circuits do. Instead, CPG researchers track how endogenous 
rhythm generation remains invariant under in vitro and in vivo conditions to support the view 
that sensory and cortical inputs are not necessary to execute functions that maintain the life of 
the organism (Marder and Bucher 2007). Conversely, searching for circuit activity that is 
invariant under in vivo and in vitro conditions supplies unreliable results when studying 
cognitive circuit functions (e.g. in vitro results may be unreliable to predict cognitive activity if 
that activity changes with behavioral context, cf. Burnston 2016). The reason why the 
applicability of these methods is confined to local patches is that they are tailored to detect, 
measure and manipulate different kinds of neural circuit function.  
In the case of “hardness”, the form of the patchwork structure depends on how empirical 
properties like yield strength or Young’s modulus of elasticity are distributed among kinds of 
materials (e.g., metal, polyamides, elastomers). Shifts between patches of “hard” are marked 
by changes in these properties. What empirical properties distinguish kinds of functions as the 
basis of different conceptual patches of “neural function”? As indicated above, I think that 
causal roles and capacities are insufficient: the fact that circuits can contribute to cognitive, 
subsistence or infrastructural capacities does not show that the underlying circuit functions are 
different in kind. The property of causal specificity is also insufficient: it only distinguishes 
cognitive circuit functions with causally specific effects from those with nonspecific effects. 
But it does not distinguish subsistence from infrastructural functions. To articulate a patchwork 
structure that distinguishes all three circuit functions, I therefore add two relational properties 
of neural circuits: their mechanistic organization and their evolutionary relations.11 Shifts in 
mechanistic organization and evolutionary relations mark shifts between the cognitive, 
subsistence and infrastructural patches of “neural function”. 
                                                          
11 Both properties have been suggested as additions to a bare bones causal role theory of neural function (Garson 
2011, McCaffrey 2015). I aim to use both as constraints on the patchwork structure of “neural function”, since 
each may be useful for functional analysis in different research contexts.   
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To understand how circuits with subsistence functions are mechanistically organized, 
recall the whisking system (Fig.3). In that system, serotonin is necessary and sufficient to cause 
rhythmic firing. Therefore, whisking CPGs can endogenously create rhythms without sensory 
input or cortical feedback. I call this type of circuit organization mechanistic decoupling from 
cognitive functions. Invariance of rhythmic CPG activity under in vitro and in vivo conditions 
counts as evidence for the mechanistic decoupling of subsistence from cognitive functions. To 
paraphrase Bursten (2016): that all CPGs with subsistence functions are susceptible to 
mechanistic decoupling is both a fact about how the concept “neural function” behaves around 
that kind of circuit, as well as a fact about the class of circuits themselves. In contrast, 
infrastructural functions are essentially coupled to cognitive information processing 
mechanisms. Gamma oscillations and chandelier inhibition occur in many cognitive contexts 
because the respective behavioral tasks places increased functional demands on cortical 
microcircuits. Without increased functional demand, the gain control mechanism is not 
executed. Negative gamma feedback may therefore be experimentally inseparable from the 
information processing mechanisms with which it co-occurs (cf. Merker 2013, p. 409). Yet, 
infrastructural functions are not part of the flow of behaviorally relevant information (Fig. 4).  
To understand how the three mesoscale functions are related evolutionarily, recall first 
that I argued that CPG circuits do not process behaviorally relevant information, but maintain 
the life of the organism. That means that if circuits with cognitive functions evolved from CPGs, 
then CPGs which were previously adapted for subsistence functions subsequently acquired 
novel, cognitive processing functions. This evolutionary relation between two functions is 
called exaptation (Gould and Vrba 1982). In contrast, the evolutionary shift from subsistence 
to infrastructural functions does not involve a novel function, but only a shift in the containing 
system to which they contribute. Whereas subsistence functions contribute to systems outside 
the CNS (e.g., lungs), which in turn maintain the entire organism, infrastructural functions 
contribute to maintaining (a part of) the CNS itself. That means that if infrastructural functions 
evolved from CPGs with subsistence functions, then CPGs became internalized to maintain 
neural infrastructure. In evolutionary neuroscience, this process is called “encephalization of 
motor rhythms” (Yuste et al. 2005, 477, see also below). By adding the properties of 
decoupling, coupling, exaptation and encephalization and the circuit diagrams from section 3 
we can now visualize the patchwork structure of “neural function” at the mesoscale as follows: 
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Fig. 5: A patchwork approach to “neural function” at the mesoscale.  
The above diagram can help us move beyond cognitive myopia because it reveals the 
actual material inferential structure of cognitive and noncognitive applications of “neural 
function” in mesoscale circuit research. These local applications are evaluated according to the 
functional patch that researchers work on (pitch circles). In the spinal cord, brain stem, and 
parts of the subcortex, researchers work on the subsistence patch because they study CPG 
circuits that are necessary to maintain the life of the organism. They refer to pacemaker and 
follower modules to explain endogenous rhythm generation in these circuits (right vertical 
arrow and P and F nodes; same architecture as in Fig. 1). When studying circuits in the cortex, 
researchers can work on the cognitive patch when referring to microcircuit elements that are 
operative in behaviorally relevant information processing (left vertical arrow, E and I nodes), 
or they can work on the infrastructural patch when referring to elements that prevent damage 
within the circuit  (middle vertical arrow, C node).12 The two patches overlap because each 
infrastructural function is mechanistically coupled to the cognitive function(s) it enables (left 
curved arrow). Conversely, analyses of cognitive circuit functions depend on the infrastructural 
patch (blue line piercing through the patch). Cognitive analyses rely on a functionally neutral 
description of CMC infrastructure, and knowledge of infrastructural functions constrains which 
cognitive analyses are biologically plausible.   
                                                          
12 The fact that cortical microcircuits as a whole execute both cognitive and infrastructural functions makes them 
multifunctional structures (McCaffrey 2015). I discuss the issue of multifunctionality further in the conclusion. 
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 Cognitive and subsistence patches also overlap because I use the graded notion of causal 
specificity to distinguish cognitive and noncognitive functions. I focused on clear cases of each 
kind to argue that researchers need to attend to nonspecific enabling conditions to overcome 
cognitive myopia. Yet there are kinds of neural function whose causal specificity lies between 
operative and enabling conditions for cognition and behavior.13 Like with the case of nylon in 
the patchwork of “hardness”, researchers may use empirical and conceptual tools from multiple 
patches to study these and other intermediate cases of “neural function”. For instance, 
researchers may have to work at the intersection of subsistence and cognitive patches when 
studying pacemaker modules that are part of an information processing mechanism. Such CPG 
modules may not be mechanistically decoupled from cognitive functions in the way known 
CPGs are (upper curved arrow, right). By making the mechanistic and evolutionary relations 
between different kinds of neural function explicit, a patchwork approach helps researchers to 
decide which conceptual and empirical tools are appropriate to investigate a given mesoscale 
circuit. Such an approach moves beyond cognitive myopia because it shows that cognitive 
neuroscientific methods and information processing vocabulary occupy only one patch in the 
patchwork structure of “neural function”. These empirical and conceptual tools are 
inappropriate when researchers study other, noncognitive kinds of function.  
To understand the advantage of a patchwork approach over a cognitively myopic picture 
of “neural function”, consider the function of unknown CPG circuits in the neocortex. Yuste et 
al. (2005, p. 481) conclude from biophysical similarities between spinal cord and cortical 
circuits that the cortex could contain “memory and learning” CPGs. This proposal assumes that 
the function of cortical CPG circuits should be evaluated with conceptual and empirical tools 
from the cognitive patch. As a result of cognitive myopia, however, Yuste and colleagues 
overlook the possibility of evaluating the function of cortical CPG circuits by combining tools 
from the subsistence and infrastructural patch. According to this proposal, oscillating CPG 
circuits in the neocortex would maintain and repair infrastructure, rather than process 
behaviorally relevant information. Besides overlooking noncognitive functions of cortical 
circuits, cognitive myopia also leads these researchers to misevaluate the evolutionary 
relationship between subsistence and cognitive functions. The patchwork approach 
distinguishes the encephalization of subsistence functions for infrastructural maintenance from 
their exaptation for behaviorally relevant information processing (curved arrows, top left and 
                                                          
13 An example is the effect of global changes of neural gain on attention and learning (Eldar et al. 2013). Unlike 
the enabling condition of local gain control, it has a graded influence on task performance. Unlike operative 
conditions such as FEF eye gaze control, however, it affects many cognitive tasks at once. 
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bottom right). Yuste et al. (2005, p. 477) simply lump these two distinct processes under the 
label “encephalization”. This example illustrates why a patchwork approach allows researchers 
to evaluate the mechanistic organization and evolutionary history of neural circuit functions 
correctly, whereas cognitive myopia does not. 
Like the circuit diagrams from sect. 3, the patchwork model of “neural function” is a 
conceptual template to be used in and revised by further empirical research. The taxonomy of 
circuit functions it provides is tailored to the purpose of understanding how information 
processing and maintenance/repair mechanisms in neural systems are related to each other.  If 
neuroscientists and philosophers aim to analyse other kinds of circuit function, they can add 
further patches or relations between patches, as well as modify the types of circuit architecture 
to which the patches refer. The promise of adopting a patchwork approach is that it helps us to 
overcome cognitive myopia by providing the conceptual tools to describe each kind of neural 
function on its own terms, rather than forcing it into inappropriate vocabulary.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
If neuroscientists and philosophers want to move beyond cognitive myopia and meet the brain 
on its own terms, they need to add noncognitive patches such as “subsistence function” and 
“infrastructural function” to their conceptual repertoire. They can use these patches to explore 
unknown entities and activities, rather than shoehorning them into cognitive vocabulary or 
discarding them as “noise” or “epiphenomena”. A patchwork approach to “neural function” 
helps researchers to better understand how these different kinds of circuit function are 
mechanistically and evolutionarily related to each other. By providing tools to study both 
cognitive and noncognitive kinds of function, such an approach also helps researchers to explain 
how the brain’s capacities as an information processing device are constrained by its ability to 
maintain and repair itself as a physiological apparatus. A patchwork approach helps 
neuroscientists to pursue research avenues that cognitive myopia prevents them to explore. To 
demonstrate the broader significance of this approach, let me conclude by sketching its 
application to other fields in neuroscience and its philosophy.  
In neuroimaging, task-independent fluctuations measured during the experimental 
“resting state” can refer to endogenous brain activity with different kinds of functional roles in 
behavior and cognition. A patchwork approach can help to classify these kinds. Endogenous 
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activities with homeostatic functions such as energy production or waste disposal are causally 
nonspecific enabling conditions for cognition and behavior (Raichle 2015, Kiviniemi et al. 
2016). Other endogenous activities serve modulatory functions, because they affect cognition 
and behavior in a graded but task-unspecific fashion. Fluctuations in cortical excitability and 
arousal are an example of such intermediate effects (Chang et al. 2016). Yet other kinds of 
endogenous brain activity are likely operative in overt behavior or cognitive operations (Fox et 
al. 2007, Smallwood et al. 2016). Because a cognitively myopic view on resting state research 
focuses on operative roles only, it risks overlooking, discarding or misevaluating kinds of 
endogenous brain activity with homeostatic or modulatory functions. Philosophers have 
overlooked the potential of resting state research to study these noncognitive and intermediate 
functions, because they have exclusively focused on its use to study cognitive functions 
(Bechtel 2013, Klein 2014, McCaffrey and Danks 2017). A patchwork approach can overcome 
this cognitively myopic focus by keeping the enabling, modulatory and operative roles of 
endogenous brain activities in view at once. 
Similar to work on resting-state neuroimaging, philosophical accounts of 
multifunctionality have overlooked noncognitive types of multifunctionality.  For example: 
noncognitive CPG circuits can be multifunctional because they are capable of switching 
between different rhythmic outputs (Brigmann and Kristan 2008). Cortical microcircuits are 
multifunctional because they execute both information processing and infrastructural functions. 
By including subsistence and infrastructural patches, a patchwork approach allows scholars to 
characterize these noncognitive or combined forms of multifunctionality. Pace Rathkopf 
(2013), a patchwork approach holds that these conceptual patches complement, rather than 
replace cognitive concepts of function to tackle multifunctionality. A patchwork approach 
furthermore extends existing accounts of multifunctionality. It adds coupling and decoupling 
as noncognitive types of mechanistic organization to McCaffrey’s typology of multifunctional 
structures (2015, Table 1). It also adds neuromodulation and physiological circuit properties as 
noncognitive kinds of context to Burnston’s contextualist approach to multifunctionality 
(Burnston 2016). Although these arguments will have to be developed in detail elsewhere, the 
examples of resting-state research and multifunctionality show that the patchwork approach can 
help neuroscientists and philosophers to overcome cognitive myopia in a variety of topics 
surrounding the concept of neural function. 
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